Supply chain and releases

Releases: signing, provenance and verification

In reviewUpdated 2026-11-15Trust Center

In review. This record, and the tools and files it cites, are on a review branch. They are not in the main source tree yet, so you cannot check them in a copy of the main source today.

Status: the tooling in tools/trust/ is implemented and tested with throw-away keys. The real release key does not exist yet; the key ceremony below is a later step and is written down so that it can be reviewed first. Until it has happened, no artifact is described as "signed by Barnyard Greens LLC" anywhere.

The Aster Runtime is licensed under the Aster Runtime EULA (publisher: Barnyard Greens LLC); its source code is private. You can check a release without the source: the file list is hashed in SHA256SUMS, the hashes are signed, and the release ships build provenance, a software bill of materials and a licence inventory. Support terms, if any, are separate from the licence (to be decided).

1. What a release contains

filewhat it is
libaster_runtime.so / .dll / .dylib, aster, aster_web.wasmthe shipped binaries (the C ABI library, the CLI, the browser target)
SHA256SUMSsha256 of every file in the release
SHA256SUMS.minisigdetached minisign signature over SHA256SUMS (one signature covers every file)
sbom/*.cdx.jsonCycloneDX 1.5 SBOM per Cargo workspace (tools/trust/sbom.sh)
vex/aster.openvex.json, vex/aster.cdx-vex.jsonVEX: exploitability statements for every RustSec advisory that matches our dependencies (tools/trust/audit.sh)
provenance.intoto.json (+ .minisig)SLSA v1 build provenance for the binaries (tools/trust/provenance.sh)
licenses.md, licenses.jsonlicence inventory (tools/trust/licenses.sh)

2. How to verify a release yourself

You need sha256sum, minisign (https://jedisct1.github.io/minisign/) and jq. The public key comes from a channel that is not the download (section 4). The examples use aster-release.pub.

Shell
# 1. integrity: every file matches the signed list
sha256sum -c SHA256SUMS

# 2. authenticity: the list was signed by the Aster release key
minisign -V -p aster-release.pub -m SHA256SUMS            # prints: Signature and comment signature verified

# 3. provenance: the binary you hold is the subject of the signed provenance
minisign -V -p aster-release.pub -m provenance.intoto.json
jq -r '.subject[] | "\(.digest.sha256)  \(.name)"' provenance.intoto.json | sha256sum -c
jq '.predicate.buildDefinition.externalParameters.source, .predicate.runDetails.builder.id' provenance.intoto.json

# 4. what is inside: components, hashes, licences, known advisories
jq '.components | length' sbom/native.cdx.json
jq -r '.components[] | select(.name=="winit") | .name, .version, .hashes[0].content' sbom/native.cdx.json
jq '.statements | length' vex/aster.openvex.json

A failed step must be treated as "do not install": report it to me@barnyak.com.

Release signatures are minisign signatures.

3. How we check our own builds

We are working toward comparing two builds of each release; this is not yet shown. Because the source is private, we do not publish rebuild instructions. Independent rebuilds are not supported.

4. The release key and the ceremony (not yet performed)

Algorithm: Ed25519 (minisign format). Rationale: small, widely implemented, offline-verifiable, no PKI to operate.

Ceremony (to be done once, by two named people, then recorded in docs/trust/keys/CEREMONY-<date>.md):

  1. Offline machine (no network, fresh OS, or a live USB). Two people present; neither works alone.
  2. minisign -G -p aster-release.pub -s aster-release.key with a strong passphrase generated by a password generator, split between the two custodians (each knows half) or stored sealed.
  3. Print the fingerprint (the 8-byte key id in the public key, plus sha256sum aster-release.pub) on paper and photograph neither.
  4. Encrypted backups of aster-release.key on two removable media in two physically separate locations (safe, safe-deposit box). The key is never stored on a networked machine, never in git (tools/trust/.gitignore and sign.sh both refuse), never in CI secrets in clear text. Preferred: generate the key on a hardware token (YubiKey / OpenSSH ed25519-sk) so it cannot be copied; the ssh method of sign.sh already supports such keys.
  5. Sign a test file, verify it on a different machine with only the public key, then publish.
  6. Publish the public key in three independent places so that tampering with one is visible: (a) in the release bundle and on the Trust Center page, (b) the trust website at https://to be decided/trust/release-key together with the fingerprint, (c) the customer contract / onboarding pack (fingerprint printed). A fingerprint mismatch between any two is treated as an incident. Fingerprint: to be decided (placeholder until the ceremony).
  7. Rotation: yearly, and immediately on any suspected exposure. A rotation announcement is signed with the old key and the new key. Revocation: a signed notice on the trust website and to customers by email; old releases stay verifiable with the old key. Releases are never re-signed silently.
  8. Dev/test keys (throw-away keys made by tests and check.sh) are generated in a temp directory, never committed, and can never be mistaken for the release key because their fingerprint is not published.

5. Making a release (procedure)

Shell
git checkout <tag>                                   # clean tree, tag is signed by a maintainer
tools/trust/check.sh                                 # sbom, licences, deny, audit, vet, repro, provenance, signing self-test
cd tools/trust/out && sha256sum repro/artifacts/* sbom/*.json vex/*.json licenses/* > SHA256SUMS
tools/trust/provenance.sh --out provenance.intoto.json repro/artifacts/*    # SLSA v1 statement
tools/trust/sign.sh --key /path/to/aster-release.key SHA256SUMS provenance.intoto.json   # prompts for the passphrase
tools/trust/verify.sh --pub docs/trust/keys/aster-release.pub SHA256SUMS provenance.intoto.json   # never ship without this

The release is not published if check.sh exits non-zero or if any step above fails.

6. Which SLSA level this is, honestly

SLSA v1.0 Build track (https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.0/levels):

levelrequirementAster today
Build L1provenance exists, says how the artifact was builtReached. provenance.sh emits an in-toto/SLSA v1 statement: source commit, command, lockfile hashes, vendored-crate tree hash, docker image id as the build environment.
Build L2hosted build platform generates and signs the provenance; consumers can verify itNot reached. The provenance is produced by a script run by the operator and signed by the operator's key. That is stronger than nothing (it is signed and tamper-evident) but the same people who can alter the build can alter the provenance. L2 needs a hosted build service (CI) that holds the signing identity and produces the statement itself.
Build L3hardened platform: isolated, ephemeral builds; signing material not accessible to the build steps; provenance unforgeable by the tenantNot reached. Needs an isolated, ephemeral builder (one container/VM per build, no shared state, no network except a pinned fetch), the signing key held by the platform outside the build's reach (or keyless, e.g. a transparency log), and a second party who can verify.

Also open: the build runs on a host we operate, so the builder.id is a placeholder URI (https://aster.invalid/builders/...) until the real builder identity is fixed; and the provenance is a bare in-toto statement signed as a file, not yet wrapped in a DSSE envelope. Signed provenance and the SBOM are what we offer today; a second party cannot recompute the bytes because the source is private.

7. Placeholders in this document

to be decided, to be decided, to be decided: to be filled by the publisher (the security contact is me@barnyak.com); nothing here invents a contact, address or price.

Source docs/trust/RELEASES.mdlast changed 2026-11-15

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